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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects or, top’cs of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
This report is the product of a research conducted with 
financial support from, the European Policy Unit and from the 
Commission of the European Communities through research project 
no. 89/33042.
Additional results obtained in this research will be made 
available through two EUI Working Papers. One of the papers, co­
authored with Dr. Renzo Daviddi, focuses on the relevance of NIC's 
export and exchange rate policies for centrally planned economies; 
the second paper focuses on issues of estimation of the effects cf 
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The long period of Dollar appreciation between 1981 and 1985 
spurred a new wave of protectionist sentiment in the United States. 
While much of the public attention was focused on Japan, however, the 
economic profession was also paying attention to the large trade balance 
surpluses accumulated by other countries as well, the Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs) especially. Pressure has been put in 
the last two-to-three years on these countries to adopt both trade- 
liberalization measures and exchange rate policies relying less heavily 
on undervalued domestic currencies.
Three facts are of special importance. First, there are signs that 
NICs are gradually opening domestic markets to foreign competition. 
Second, the U.S. Dollar has not nearly depreciated as much vis-a-vis 
NICs currencies as it has relative to EEC currencies and the Yen. 
Third, NICs are growing at a rate above that of the rest of the world. 
These three facts imply that these countries will keep relying heavily 
on growing shares of foreign markets, especially OECD countries other 
than the U.S.. Thus, it is argued that the mixture of new U.S. trade 
legislation and recent exchange rate changes may affect the patterns of 
Internationa 1 trade by increasing the volume of trade between NICS and 
EEC relatively more than that between NICs and the rest of the world.
An increase in the volume of trade is not likely to affect any two 
industries in the same way. It was believed until recently that NICs 
exports are generally labor-intensive due to their relative factor 
endowments. If this were true, one would expect the most labor 




























































































those products) to be hit hardest by competition. There are signs, 
however, that thinking of NICs exports as necessarily labor intensive is 
no longer adequate. South Korea, for instance, already in 1973 adopted 
a policy of incentives to capital intensive industries. While right now 
policymakers there appear to be questioning aspects of that choice (Kim, 
1988), it is clear that at least the most dynamic among the NICs have 
already in place a policy of gradual shift of their resources away from 
labor intensive productions. If this process appeared to be generalized 
among NICs, capital intensive and/or high-tech European industries ought 
to be aware that new competitors are coming into the market.
The general aim of this project is to supply policy-relevant 
evidence on the effects of economic growth and exchange rate 
fluctuations on the patterns of exports from the NICs to the EEC. 
Attention is paid to 1. the possible re-directicn of exports frctn the 
U.S. to Europe following the 1985 depreciation of the Dollar; and 2. 
the differential effects at the industry level.
I first document the time and commodity patterns of trade between 
EEC and NICs over the last twenty years. These are the years of 
flexible exchange rates a well as those of most rapid growth of the NICs 
GNP and trade volume. An effort is made to identify the pattern of 
trade for at least broad categories of goods, rather than rely solely on 
extremely aggregated variables such as the trade balance or the ratio of 
exports to GNP. This type of research has been carried out in the United 
States for a while now, due to the growing share of U.S. trade with the 
NICs, but it has not been pursued extensively in Europe yet.




























































































rate in determining the patterns of trade for the NICs over the last 
twenty years. Since 1973 the value of all major currencies has 
fluctuated vastly. In the years of strong Dollar appreciation against 
most currencies, most Asian NICs were careful to keep their currencies 
undervalued, so as to make their goods very competitive on the U.S. 
market. This is a sign of how heavily exchange rate considerations weigii 
in the trade policy mix of many NICs, and suggests relatively high 
dollar-price elasticities for NICs exports. With the U.S. Dollar 
depreciating more than one third relative to EEC currencies and the Yen 
in the last three years, and their own currencies virtually unchanged 
relative to the U.S. Dollar, NICs can benefit from the same kind of 
price-competitiveness edge the U.S. are benefiting from relative to the 
EEC. Furthermore, it is unlikely that NICs will engage in further 
rounds of devaluations relative to the Dollar, for the U.S. trade 
deficit is so large that a competitive devaluation strategy would 
unleash protectionist pressures even stronger than those already 
existing in the U.S. Congress. These considerations lead to the 
tentative conclusion that as the period of strong Dollar appreciation 
led to penetration of NICs exports into the U.S. market, the present 
period of Dollar weakness will lead to accelerated penetration of those 
exports into Europe.
The results from this research are presented in greater detail in 
the concluding section. Here I summarize them very briefly.
1. Results from this research tend to support the hypothesis that the 
long run effect of exchange rate policy are relatively small. Estimates 
of long-run elasticities of NICs exports show that in general income 




























































































relative prices. In the long run, when changes in domestic prices 
adjust following exchange rate shocks, competitiveness is driven more by- 
productivity differentials than by changes in exchange rates.
2. But in the short run exchange rate changes do appear to have a 
substantial impact, though such is not always the case: France and 
Italy do not show any sizable reaction to the change even in the shorter 
time frame; but the relationship is there, and rather strong, for 
Germany and the U.S.. There exists a correlation between the bilateral 
exchange rate and the value of imports of these countries, as it is 
confirmed by the fact that U.S. imports from the NICs increased most 
during the years of maximum Dollar strength, and that EEC imports 
increased most after 1985, the years of Dollar weakness.
3. The commodity composition of European imports from NICs has changed. 
European countries are converging toward a pattern of import composition 
that more and more resembles that of the U.S., where mechanical and 
electrical manufactures are the most important import category, and the 
"traditional" NICs exports are less important. Econometric analysis at 
the industry level yielded a list of industries whose export performance 
appears to have been positively affected by exchange rate changes. The 
list appears at the end of section IV.
4. The increase in domestic European GDP expected as a consequence of 
the completion of the internal market is large enough that a large 
influx of NICs goods can be expected over the next few years. If what 
was said under point 1. above is correct, this income effect is likely 
to be at least of the same order of magnitude as any relative price 





























































































The general aim of this project is to supply policy-relevant 
evidence on the effects of economic growth and exchange rate 
fluctuations on the patterns of exports from the NICs to the EEC, with 
attention being paid to the possible re-direction of exports from the 
U.S. to Europe following the 1985 depreciation of the Dollar.
There exist at least two independent reasons why such question is 
most relevant at this time. First, there are the large fluctuations in 
the value of the U.S. Dollar relative to the European currencies 
experienced now for almost twenty years. Such fluctuations change the 
price of U.S. goods when expressed in domestic currency in a way that is 
not necessarily consistent with the macro- and micro-economic targets of 
the policy maker, nor with the movements in productivities across 
countries. At the same time fluctuations of the Dollar do not 
necessarily affect only the domestic currency price of U.S. goods being 
sold in Europe. A number of developing countries peg the value of their 
domestic currency to that of the Dollar, or to a basket of currencies in 
which the Dollar has a predominant weight. When the Dollar depreciates 
against European currencies, a host of other currencies depreciate with 
it to some extent. Thus, not only U.S. goods become more price- 
competitive in Europe, but so do those of a number of other countries as 
well.
The second important reason to study the pattern of trade and 
exchange rate policy of developing countries toward Europe is the 
acceleration of the process of European economic integration through the 




























































































completion of the internal market by 1992. Research promoted by the 
Commission has been focused so far on the effects of the completion of 
the internal market on (1) the European economy as a whole — the 
Cecchini Report on the Cost of non-Europe, and (2) effects on industries 
and regions within the Community. By their nature studies of this type 
assume away external effects and possible feedbacks on the domestic 
market. Among the important aspects of external effects of completion 
of the internal market are precisely the effects on the relative prices 
of import and export goods, and the patterns of trade that are likely to 
result from the process of integration.
There are basically two questions we want to address. The first 
question is long-run, structure oriented, and asks whether there is a 
long-run scope for exchange rate policy by developing countries. This 
is a difficult question to answer for at least two reasons. First of 
all, small developing countries seldom resort to an independent exchange 
rate policy. More often they peg their currency to one of the major 
currencies or to a basket of them. When exchange rates among major 
currencies are realigned, or simply due to daily rate fluctuations, the 
pegging country is subject to undesired changes in its currency's 
parity. This has (undesired) effects on the degree of competitiveness 
relative to each of the major currency areas, and may force resource 
reallocations and redirection of trade flows. (See, for instance, 
Bautista and Riedel, 1982).
We address this long-run, structural-type analysis by resorting to 
traditional regression analysis for a period of twenty-one years, from 





























































































The second question we want to address is that of the short and 
medium run effects of the Dollar depreciation on trade flows from NICs 
to EEC since 1985. There are at least two reasons why this question is 
of crucial importance at this stage: the first is that most NICs peg 
their currency to the Dollar, the second that so far the U.S. has been 
the most sizable market for the NICs. There are two implications for 
policy here. On the one hand a depreciation of the U.S. Dollar vis-a-vis 
the European currencies determines a growing price competitiveness not 
only for U.S. goods priced in Dollars, but also for any good priced in 
any currency pegged to the Dollar. This is equivalent to saying that 
the Dollar depreciation may have enhanced the price competitiveness of 
U.S. goods in Europe, but it has done so for goods exported by NICs as 
well. On the other hand, the hitherto large share of NICs exports into 
the U.S. market is a warning that, even if the price effects were to be 
relatively small, the overall effect of trade creation-plus-diversion 
toward the Community may not be negligible at all.
Our purpose is to identify those sectors that are most sensitive to 
exchange rate changes. There is some evidence of very sizable effects 
of exchange rate changes on specific industries. Branson and Love 
(1987, 1988) provide such evidence for the U.S. at the national, 
regional, and state level for a large number of manufacturing 
industries. Richardson (1988) shows that the U.S. auto industry has 
been greatly protected by Dollar movements over the last twelve years or 
so. To identify sectors that are most affected by exchange rate changes 
I estimate demand functions for NICs exports by the U.S. and the four 
large Community members. This is also a way of shedding light on whether 




























































































The report is structured in six Sections. The analysis is focused 
on different countries and different industries in different parts, 
according to data availability, policy relevance, and analytical 
difficulty. In the first Section I discuss some of the relevant 
literature on "successful development" and illustrate some descriptive 
statistics showing in what sense the expression "successful development" 
is to be understood for the purposes of this report. This allows the 
discussion of development and trade policies to be conducted later to be 
confined within clearly defined limits.
Section II is devoted to a discussion of the relationship between 
exchange rate policy, export performance, and growth. In the first part 
I discuss the effects that exchange rate changes may have on the level 
of exports and real economic activity of the country. The focus is more 
on the importance of market structure and industrial organization 
characteristics than on the well known pass-through effect of exchange 
rate on relative prices in a world of perfect competition. The second 
part of the section reports some recent empirical estimates of the 
theoretical effects discussed in the first part.
Section III aims at describing the long-run development of trade 
flows from NICs to EEC and/or its major member countries. Data are 
available from 1967 to 1987 on an annual basis for a number of 
industrial sector, which is sufficient to study the relationship between 
exchange rates and flows of exports. In this Section I also bring the 
United States into the picture, and try to estimate the different 
characteristics of the flow of trade from NICs to U.S. as opposed to 




























































































Section IV abandons the descriptive character of the previous 
section and presents results from the econometric analysis of the 
relation between flows of exports and exchange rate policies. I still 
concentrate on the annual dataset to estimate the sectoral impact of 
exchange rate changes and import-demand on the flow of exports.
In Section V I exploit a monthly dataset made available by Eurostat 
through the CRONOS databank to study the directions of trade between 
1983 and 1989. Ihe results produced here are immediately relevant for 
short term policy design as well as to emphasize new pattern of trade 
that appear to have emerged since the great Dollar depreciation of 1985. 
To the best of my knowledge these are entirely novel results. 
Section VI summarizes the results and reports on the conclusions. The 
policy implications of the research reported here are probably best seen 
in this Section, where the technical aspect of the research is kept at a 




























































































I. INDICATORS FOR A TAXONOMY OF SUCCESSFUL DEVETOPTNG OTCJOTRIES
What is the criterion that should guide in the selection of the 
"representative" countries when it comes to export performance? 
"Success" ought to be a likely candidate. Unfortunately, it is unclear 
what the ingredients of a "strategy of successful development" ought to 
be — and it is especially unclear whether exchange rate policy is one 
such ingredient. The great debate of the 1950s and 1960s was centered 
on the dichotomy export promotion-import substitution. Contrary to 
what much of the contemporary literature appears to believe, the success 
of countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore is 
not necessarily a proof of the superiority of the former strategy over 
the latter, which was being adopted, for instance, by India. One cannot 
simply forget that countries belonging to the "Gang of Four" have some 
very crucial institutional and geographical characteristics that do not 
apply to many other countries: they are very small, very densely 
populated, enjoy (and/or have enjoyed for decades) special political and 
financial status, strong ties of military and economic nature with major 
countries, even a special political status. One cannot forget all this, 
and attribute to commercial policy merits (and demerits) the roots of 
which extend well beyond trade-related political choices. Additional, 
and possibly even alternative, hypotheses ought to be investigated.
A possible candidate is the traditional comparative-advantage 
approach. Some countries, later to be known as "Newly Industrializing," 
perhaps simply exploited some of the advantages they were endowed with: 
for instance, their relative labor abundance. But this explanation is 
no longer entirely convincing: why have other countries not benefited 




























































































abundance was coupled with relative abundance of skilled labor and/or
natural resources? (1) Other factors must have played a role.
Recent theoretical literature suggests that scale economies may be 
one such factor. (2) The hypothesis is that comparative advantage is 
generated by falling marginal costs associated with productive units of 
larger and larger size, which are established just to exploit such 
economies of scale. Two are the strong points of this hypothesis: a 
large, and growing, share of international trade is intra-industry 
trade; and the international markets are imperfectly competitive. Alas, 
at least two are the drawbacks of this approach when one wants to 
investigate the determinants of trade flows originating from Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs). The first problem is that intra-industry 
trade is mostly a European and North-American phenomenon. LDCs have 
little intra-industry trade for the basic reason that they lack large 
industrial sectors required to exploit economies of scale, and 
specialize in commodity exports instead. The second reason why the 
imperfect competition model is not adequate in our case is that 
economies of scale in these countries can be exploited virtually by 
multinationals alone. Thus, it would be difficult to determine whether 
these economies ought to be attributed to the host or to the guest 
country.
1. RobertE. Baldwin (1971, 1979) has shed light on the relevance of 
these factors in the explanation of the direction of trade flows.
2. This is the stream of literature on international trade and 
imperfect competition developed in Helpman and Krugman (1985).




























































































development strategies result from interventionist policies. Clearly, 
this is not to say that any interventionist policy leads to success. 
Rather, the point is that "natural" endowments and comparative 
advantages may be exploited by amplifying their relevance and their 
impact through measures of economic policy.
Thus, "success" not being an entirely objective concept, its 
indicators must necessarily be arbitrary to some extent. For instance, 
the rate of growth of per-capita income may be an indicator to start out 
with, but then one has to realize that the distribution of income is 
also important. Which is the most successful country, that with higher 
per-capita income and more unequal distribution, or that with lower per- 
capita income and a more equal distribution? Let us suppose that this 
is not a problem, and think about the external situation of two 
countries with identical trade deficits. Are they really facing the 
same problem, or does the commodity composition of the imports make a 
difference as to the relative ability to pay off the debt in the future? 
And, as a final example, are there any meaningful ways in which a 
country whose export-led growth starts out in the troubled 1970s can be 
defined to be less successful than one whose higher rates of growth find 
their roots in the 1960s, the era of fast growth of world demand?
Any exercise in taxonomy of "successful" is necessarily arbitrary 
to some extent. Dervis and Petri (1987) suggest choosing the seven best 
performers with respect to any given variable over some (arbitrarily 
chosen) period of time. Table 1.1, from their paper, shows that per- 
capita growth rates of Gross Domestic product would lead to label as 




























































































Table I.1 Measures of Growth in GDP per Capita, 1965-1985 
(Percent per Annum)
I9« > -  I 'M .') In ter-  
Rent / y r  en/ntn ttn tun till fn irehn<iny
Ci i n n l r v
cor yriiiW/t p ' l i r r  \ 'n m i h
1963-- 1985 1979.- P is 5 Raw
D ebt-
ad justed
ratera le rank r.ilc rank r.iti* ra n k
T aiw an. P rov ince  o f C h in a * 8.6 1 5.2 1 7.9 “>
Korea * 6.9 2 4.1 1 8.4 1 8.2
B raz il* 4.3 3 -0 .1 10 3.2 4 3.U
T h a ila n d * 4.3 4 3.5 3 3.5 3 3.4
P ortuga l* 4.0 5 1.9 4 2.8 5 2.4
G reece* 3.8 6 0.3 S 2.7 6 2.5
Y ugoslavia  * 3.5 7 0.2 9 1.6 s 1.4
T urkev 2.9 8 1.7 3 1.4 9 1.3
C olom bia 2.4 9 11.7 6 0.7 10 0.6
D o m in ica n  R epublican 1.9 10 - 0 .5 I I -1 .4 17 - 1 .7
P h ilip p in e s 1.5 I I -1 .9 15 0.5 11 0.3
M orocco 1.4 12 0.4 7 -0 .3 14
Bolivia 1.4 13 - 4  5 19 - 2 .7 19 -3 .3
G uatem ala 0.9 14 - 3 .2 17 2.0 7 1.9
S outh  A frica 0.8 15 -0 .7 12 Ü.U 13
Z im babw e 0.6 16 0.5 12
A rg e n tin a 0.4 17 -3 .1 16 -0 .9 15 - l . l
C h ile 0.4 18 -0 .7 13 - 1 .9 18 -2 .5
Zam bia 0.3 19 - 1 .6 14 -3 .2 20 - 3 .9
Ivo ry  Coast -0 .1 20 -3 .5 18 -1 .2 16 - 1 .9
Panel M ean 2.5 -0 .1 1.2 0.9
A -G ro u p  M ean 5.0 2.2 4.3 4.0
tfole: International purchasing p*rwcr is calculated as nominal GDP deflated bv the average wholesale 
price index of five major industrial countries converted to domestic currency using official exchange 
rates. Debt-adjusted Index subtracts from  international purchasing power GDP interest obligations on 
foreign debt.




























































































Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Colombia. Official OECD publications 
include only the first three in the class of Newly Industrializing 
Countries, along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Mexico.
A second indicator of success may be the growth rate of the share 
of world market of market economies by each country. Presence on the 
world market is an indicator of success in that it identifies anability 
to compete on the open market, that is, an ability to produce and 
distribute worldwide at competitive price. (3) Table 1.2 reports 
OECD calculations of market shares for six developed and developing 
countries. It shows that growth rates of market shares have been 
consistently higher for OECD-defined NICs than for any of the major OECD 
countries since 1963.
A third indicator of development is the rate at which the 
manufacturing sector grows relative to the rest of the economy. On this 
ground Di Bartolomeo (1988) chooses to identify as "emerging" seven 
Asian countries — Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines-- and two South American countries --Argentina 
and Brasil—  which "may represent an interesting way to evaluate the 
seven Asian countries in that they enjoy similar levels of industrial 
development." (Di Bartolomeo, p. 153). The taxonomy suggested by the 
author derives from her wish to classify countries on the basis of the 
level and composition of commodity trade with the rest of the world, her 
final goal being the identification of an implicit model of development 
that would appear to be common to all nine countries.
3i While it is conceivable that some market share can be conquered 
through heavy subsidization of the export sector, it is less so that 
such process could last for a long time on a large scale. Thus, the 


















































































































































































































































































































































































II. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, EXPORT PERFORMANCE, AND GROWTH
'The simple fact is that Koreans work longer." (Dombusch and Park, 
1987). This is not to say that labor costs and productivity are 
identical across countries, of course, and that the comparative 
advantage of South Korean firms is simply given by a higheiMhan-average 
utilization rate of existing capacity. Hooper and Larin (1988) calculate 
that unit labor costs fluctuate with nominal exchange rates, and that by 
early 1988 unit labor costs in the United States were lower that those 
of most other industrialized countries, with the only exception of South 
Korea. Through what channels do nominal exchange rates affect relative 
unit labor costs, and thus conpetitiveness?
This Section is sub-divided in two parts. The first part reviews 
the theoretical reasons why exchange rate rate movements may be expected 
to have real effects — that is, effects on relative prices, resource 
allocation, and flows of trade. The second part of the section is 
devoted to existing empirical estimates of the size of parameters 
crucial to the effectiveness of exchange rate policy to activate those 
real effects that the theory identifies.
II. 1 Effects of Exchange Rate Changes in Theory
The crucial point of interest for us is whether exchange rate 
policies can be used to enhance export performance. In principle, there 
is no reason why a devaluation ought to turn out to be a "good." 
Consider the following example of a small open economy facing a given 
world price for its export good. A devaluation (depreciation) of the 




























































































good, thus making it more attractive to foreign buyers. The usual 
assumption of "smallness" used here implies that the rest of the world 
is in principle able to absorb any possible amount that may be offered 
at the lower (in foreign currency) price. But is the volume of exports 
going to increase under all circumstances as a result of the 
devaluation? The answer is that there are several important conditions 
that must be satisfied before the volume of exports — and thus their 
value expressed in foreign currency—  may increase.
The first such condition is that the rest of the world (the 
"foreign country") be a free trader and not ready to start a chain of 
competitive devaluations. Also, it must be the case that quantitative 
restrictions, such as quotas, did not exist prior to the devaluation, 
for in such an instance there would be no change in the volume of 
imports by definition.
The second condition for a devaluation to be successful is that the 
price elasticity of the basket of exported goods in the importing 
country be significantly greater than one. At a price elasticity of 
one, what is gained in volume is lost in foreign currency earned per 
unit of exported good, and total receipts of foreign currency is 
unchanged. (4) The size of the price elasticity of exports from 
developing countries is a very controversial issue. In an attempt to 
see whether it would be realistic for developing countries to use
4! This type of consideration is obviously long-run in nature, and it 
may not be of great concern if the problem is to establish a beach-head 




























































































currency devaluations as a means to increase receipts of hard currency 
with which to pay their debts, Marquez and McNeil ly (1986) report that 
existing studies vary widely as to the price elasticity of inport demand 
from industrial countries, with many reporting zero elasticity.
A third line of problems arises considering that a devaluation is 
bound to have different effects on different exported goods, which 
results in different relative prices for those goods in the importing 
country as a consequence of the existence of different elasticities of 
demand for different export goods. To see this point one can imagine 
that a 10% devaluation makes all exported goods 10% cheaper in foreign 
currency relative to the basket of foreign goods. This is equivalent to 
shifting the supply of the export goods to the right. But suppose that 
the two export goods — which for simplicity are assumed to show the same 
supply function—  face demand functions of different elasticities. Then 
it must be the case that the original equilibrium relative price is 
going to be altered, for the new equilibrium price for the good with the 
less elastic demand function is greater than the price of the other 
good, that facing the more elastic demand function.
Thus, even in this simple case it can be shown that a devaluation 
is not sector-neutral, which is to say that a devaluation activates a 
change in relative prices potentially large enough to generate a flow of 
resources away from one sector toward the other. It follows that 
exchange rate policy, while allowing for a change of relative prices 
between exported and imported goods, does not allow to control the 
extent to which each particular branch of the export sector is going to 




























































































This is by no means a secondary problem in the case of a developing 
country which aims at a "balanced" growth of its export sector relative 
to the rest of the economy. The devaluation might, and in general will, 
generate demand pressure on sectors that are not considered to be of 
strategic importance by the exporting country, thus forcing the fiscal 
authority to intervene to correct the imbalance.
Other limits of devaluations as strategic policy instruments have 
been emphasized in the literature. Schydlowsky (1982) points out that 
in the case of developing countries generalized devaluations are not 
sophisticated policy tools in that they are not adequate to unchain 
adequate supply-side responses. These are two two reasons for the 
inefficacy of devaluations in LDCs: low price elasticity of export 
supply and income elasticity of demand, coupled with the large size of 
the non-traded goods sector relative to the traded goods sector.
Schydlowsky's point rests on the observation that the aggregate 
supply curve for LDCs exportables is generally S-shaped: low 
elasticities of supply for mining and industrial agriculture coexist 
with relatively high elasticities of supply for the manufacturing 
sector, the problem is that the latter is heavily dependent on imported 
intermediate inputs and spare parts, so that the positive effect of the 
devaluation on the supply side is hindered by the increased costs of 
inputs expressed in local currency. The net overall effect is that the 
elasticity of net exports to exchange rate changes appears to be low. 
Schydlowsky concludes suggesting differential devaluations, that is, an 
exchange rate for each class of products at a level capable of raising 




























































































A second problem has to do with the macroeconomics of devaluations: 
are devaluations really expansionary in the aggregate? The question is 
not an academic one. Throughout the experience with fixed exchange 
rates, devaluations have been used mostly as a means to reverse — or at 
least slow down—  the accumulation of foreign debt resulting from 
current account imbalances, whereas fiscal and monetary policy were 
"assigned" to growth and stability of the domestic component of the 
economy. (5) Even if devaluations were not expansionary, it would still 
be the case that a change in the terms of trade could be brought about, 
and exports stimulated. But the problem is that this stimulus to the 
export sector would have to be strategically very important to overcame 
the welfare loss associated with the devaluation-induced recession.
What is the likelihood that a devaluation turns out to be 
contractionary? Edwards (1986) summarizes several theoretical reasons 
why such can be the case. First of all, the price increase associated 
with the devaluation generates a negative real balance effect, which in 
turn results in lower aggregate demand at existing levels of output. If 
this real-balance effect is sizable, the contractionary effect may even 
more-than-offset the expenditure-switching effect.
At least two more demand-side effects can be identified that may 
potentially lead to a recession. The first is that the devaluation may 
alter the distribution of income in favor of groups with a higher-than 
average marginal propensity to save, thus resulting in lower aggregate 
demand and falling output. Endless are the channels through which this 
type of redistribution may take place in the devaluing country: it will 
suffice to remember that devaluations are usually accompanied by wage




























































































and public spending freezes even in nominal terms, while it is current 
practice for the wealthy in LDCs to hold bank accounts in foreign 
currency, or directly abroad.
The third demand-side effect has to do with the price elasticities 
of demand for imports and exports. If these are sufficiently low, a 
devaluation generates a trade balance deficit when evaluated in domestic 
currency, which worsens the net asset position of the country vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world.
And devaluations may be contractionary also because of supply-side 
characteristics of the devaluing country. One may think of a scenario 
in which a devaluation is (unexpectedly) announced to enhance the export 
capability of the domestic manufacturing sector through relative price 
changes. In the absence of any offsetting fiscal or credit measures, 
the price of imported intermediate inputs is bound to increase when 
expressed in domestic currency (6), thus affecting the cost function of 
the domestic manufacturing firm, the more so the more drastic the 
devaluation.
Empirical evidence supplied by Edwards (1986) supports the 
hypothesis that devaluations are indeed contractionary in the short run 
— a period of roughly one year—  and that such effect is reversed in the 
longer run. This result emphasizes the need to account for the 
macroeconomic effects of exchange rate policies, when attempting to 
evaluate their overall desirability: it may well be the case that less
~6. A different result obtains if the exporting firm is alleged to keep 
the foreign exchange earned on the foreign market and purchase its 
inputs in hard currency. If the firm is not large enough to affect the 




























































































developed Countries are ready to sacrifice short-run growth objectives 
on the altar of long-run strength in the export-led industrial sector.
II.2 Estimated Effects of Exchange Kate Clianges
Recently, some strands of research on third-world debt have 
emphasized that debt is a real, as opposed to monetary, phenomenon, so 
that real have to be the ways out of it. Third world debtor countries 
cannot inflate their way out of the debt, which is for the most part 
denominated in U.S. Dollars. At the same time, lenders have shown some 
willingness to compromise on the terms of loan repayment, but to date 
forgiveness of the debt is still mostly a word, not a major, agreed-upon 
policy. Thus, debtor countries have to find the hard currency they need 
to pay back their debts through current account (balance of trade) 
surpluses. Is this a feasible way out? While we are not interested in 
the specific question in this research, addressing such a question is 
instrumental to our interest on the feasibility of exchange rate policy 
as a way of redirecting flows of trade.
There only exist two ways to generate a current account surplus: to 
import relatively less that the foreign country for each increase in 
income, and to render one's own goods relatively less expensive than 
comparable foreign goods on foreign markets, hoping that falling export 
revenues per unit of output may be more than compensated by the rising 
number of exported units. Two elasticities are crucial in this 
mechanism: the income elasticity of demand and price elasticity of 
demand. I do not deal with supply elasticities in this context.




























































































widely as to the estimates of the price elasticity of import demand from 
industrial countries, with many reporting zero elasticities. The 
authors also supply both an overview of historical estimates of such 
elasticities, and new estimates of their own for goods generally 
imported by the United States from non-OPEC developing countries. Table 
II.1 is from their paper.
Table II.l Non-oil Exports of Developing Countries: Comparison of 
Selected Studies
Country Aggregation Elasticity
Author Exporter Inporter Data Commodity Income Price
Bond (1985)(a) Non-Oil Industrial Annual All -0.1
IDC 1967-81 Goods 2.4 -0.8
Goldstein Non-Oil Industrial Annual Non-Oil 1.3 0.0
Khan (1982)(b) IDC 1963-80
Cline (1984)(c)World Industrial Annual Non-Oil 3.1 0.0
1961-81
Dombusch (c) Non-Oil World Annual Non-Oil 2.4 -1.2
(1985) IDC 1960-83 4.7
Grossman (d) Non-Oil U.S. Quarterly 7-digit 0.2, -4.5.
(1982) IDC 1968-78 SITC 7.5 -0.5
Riedel (c) Non-Oil Industrial Annual Non-Oil 0.9. 0
(1984) IDC 1960-78 1.3
a. The estimation method is indirect least squares. ^
b. The estimation method uses the average of the percentage changes of 
the ratio between IDC exports to OECD countries and the OECD real GDP.
c. The estimation method is ordinary least squares.
d. The estimation method is two-stage least squares.




























































































and price elasticities by recent major studies. The most important 
result for our purposes is that the price elasticity estimated by most 
authors is negative — which is what theory predicts it ought to be—  
but the size of which is worrisome: three studies out out of six report 
price elasticities insignificantly different from zero, one (Bond, 1985) 
reports virtually the same result, Dombusch (1985) reports one that is 
slightly above -|1|, and Grossman's (1982) is basically inconclusive.
Is there a reason for this result? It is conceivable that, given 
the time frame and the degree of aggregation chosen by the studies 
reported here, commodity exports dominate the scene relative to 
manufactures. Since the former do have a low elasticity of demand, 
the overall result hides the "true" elasticity of manufactures demand to 
their own price. This is something to keep in mind to develop this line 
of research.
What is the conclusion to be drawn from the result supplied in the 
literature on the price elasticity of demand for exports? Coeteris 
paribus a devaluation will not increase receipts of hard currency, and 
it would actually result in a loss for most of the estimated 
coefficients. Thus, this result would lead us to believe that 
competitive exchange rate policies ought not to be particularly 
appealing to developing countries, due to the relative unresponsiveness 
of quantity demanded to prices. Indeed, they would be better off 
letting their currency appreciate and their exports command a higher 
return in hard currency, given such unresponsiveness.
At the same time it ought to be kept in mind that the price of an 




























































































other good. A fall in the export price of a good may well be more than 
compensated by a host of other factors. For instance, in an attempt to 
come up with an "objective" measure of trade policy biases, Krueger 
(1978) and Bhagwati (1978) have suggested an indicator that is the ratio 
of the effective exchange rate available to exporters to the exchange 
rate paid by importers. But such an indicator is obviously extremely 
difficult to compute: one ought to factor in subsidies and all kinds of 
export-promoting measures on the one hand, and quotas, tariffs, and non­
tariff barriers to trade on the other, in addition to the general 
monetary and fiscal stance of the government, the existence of selective 
credit controls, and so on. (7) The upshot is that is this difficult to 
find a clear-cut relationship between price variables and trade 
performance, when so many important variables cannot be controlled for.
The other crucial elasticity is that with respect to income in the 
importing country — generally a developed one. Krugman (1988) has 
recently pointed out an empirical regularity, and advanced a possible 
explanation for it. The empirical regularity is that countries that 
have grown at higher-than-average annual rates appear to have enjoyed 
both a high income elasticity of demand for their exports and a low 
income elasticity for their inports. This especially lucky combination 
of parameters could well be the reason why these countries do not appear 
to be forced to long-run competitive devaluations of their real exchange 
rates: as they grow, their net exports grow as well, and need not be 
stimulated through real depreciations. Thus, long-run purchasing power
7. This point is made very clearly by Bradford and Branson (1987) in 
their attempt to overcame the inward looking vs. outward looking 




























































































parity would appear to hold as a result of a lucky combination of income 
elasticities. Krugman goes on to explain why this type of explanation 
sounds unconvincing to him, and suggest an alternative one. For the 
present purposes we need not follow him. But there are two implications 
of this "stylized fact" that are of interest for our own work.
The first important implication of Krugman's "stylized fact" is 
that the exchange rate beacmes just a short-run policy instrument. As 
the process of growth and development goes on, the supply side effects 
of growth make the developing country more and more like its developed 
partner, and the role of the exchange rate as a determinant of the 
pattern of trade falters. The second implication has to do with how 
dynamic comparative advantages are generated. If, as I have suggested 
earlier, it is unlikely that countries in the early stages of their 
development may be able to exploit economies of scale of their domestic 
industries, it is still possible for them to do so as a result of an 
activist exchange rate policy aimed at building a domestic export sector 
large enough to exploit such economies. Once established, this sector 
would no longer require protectionist devaluations to be profitable.
Is there any empirical support for this hypothesis? Since it is 
not the purpose of this report to review the methodologies employed and 
the quantitative results obtained by the empirical literature on the 
relationship between trade regime, export growth, and growth of 
aggregate real activity, I limit the discussion to a brief summary of 
the state of existing research. Edwards (1989) offers a good overview 
of such research.




























































































output growth are mostly associated with the names of Balassa (1978) and 
Michaely (1977). One of the directions taken by this literature is to 
test the hypothesis of a positive influence of exports on real aggregate 
activity by adding the volume of exports to a standard production 
function including labor and capital. In general, large and significant 
values of the coefficient on export growth has been found in these 
studies, and this finding has been interpreted as evidence supporting 
the hypothesis of a causal link running from export to output growth.
More recently this interpretation has been challenged on several 
grounds. On the one hand, Bhagwati (1986) criticizes the lack of tests 
of policy effectiveness for the policy instruments that the empirical 
results are supposed to indicate, and comes to the conclusion that 
existing evidence obtained through estimation of export-augmented 
production functions ought to be interpreted as no more than (mild) 
indirect evidence in favor of export-promoting policies. On the other 
hand, Jung and Marshall (1985) challenge the interpretation of existing 
empirical evidence on the basis that traditional regression analysis is 
not capable of indicating the direction of causality between dependent 
and independent variables. Accordingly, they suggest testing for the 
presence of Granger causality to determine whether evidence exists that 
the growth of exports is actually leading output growth.
In conclusion, neither the theoretical nor the empirical research 
appear to supply a satisfactory set of guidelines to the policy maker.
On the theoretical ground, I have discussed several reasons why a 
policy of devaluations, or undervaluation, may not generate the expected 




























































































of the gains from the de/undervaluation, and reasons that have to do 
with the response of domestic income and absorption. Yet, strong 
reasons exist for a devaluation policy to be effective.
On the empirical side, I have reported discouragingly low own-price 
elasticities of exports recently presented in the literature. On the 
basis of such estimates the policy maker ought to avoid counting on the 
effects of relative price changes to enhance export activities, but one 
does see that competitive undervaluation is an often used tool.
The next three sections are entirely devoted to quantitative 





























































































III. IONG HIN TRENDS OF EXPORTS FROM HIE NICS TO HIE U.S. AND EUROIE: 
DESCRIITIVE ANALYSIS
Goal of this section is to identify qualitatively signs of major 
shifts in the patterns of trade that may be associated with exchange 
rate movements. More rigorous quantitative techniques are employed in 
the next section. I concentrate on OECD imports from NICs, and totally 
disregard the opposite flow of trade for the purpose of this project. 
The approach is to evaluate preliminary evidence on the relationship 
between export volumes and their geographic direction on the one hand, 
and exchange rate movements on the other over the period 1967-87. Post- 
1987 annual data on trade flows are not available at the time this 
report is being written. We deal with post 1985 evidence in Section V, 
where we exploit a monthly data set on bilateral trade flews covering 
the period 1984-1988.
III.l Overview of NICs performance in the Aggregate
I start out by reviewing the most recent evidence on the economic 
relationship between six Nics and the OECD area. The six countries are 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Brazil. The OECD 
area is that defined in the OECD charter, plus those countries that 
became members subsequently. (8)
8. The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The following countries became Members subsequently through accession at 
the dates in parentheses: Japan (28 April 1964), Finland (28 January 
1969), Australia (7 June 1971), and New Zealand (29 May 1973). The 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia takes part in some of the work 




























































































Data available beginning in 1964 show that NICs exports to OECD 
countries have increased manifolds, and that this happened mostly at the 
expense of other OECD countries' exports. Evidence from Table III.l 
supports the view that EEC and North America have lost sizable shares of 
exports markets in favor of NICs and Japan in roughly the same 
proportions. Table III.2 confirms that the Asian NICs have performed 
much better than the Latin Americans, both individually and in the 
aggregate.
Table III.l Imports of Manufactured Products by OECD from Selected 
countries (Total=SITC 5, 6-68,7,8). Market Shares, in Percentages.
YEAR NICS FRANCE GERMANY ITALY U.K. EEC USA
USA +
CANADA JAPAN
1964 1.6 7.3 19.8 5.5 11.4 44.0 17.2 21.2 4.6
1973 4.7 8.0 19.1 6.0 7.1 40.2 13.8 18.8 7.3
1978 6.3 7.9 17.4 6.8 6.8 38.9 12.5 17.1 9.1
1979 6.4 8.2 17.5 7.0 6.9 39.6 12.8 16.9 8.1
1980 6.5 8.2 17.1 6.8 6.9 39.0 13.0 16.8 8.8
1981 7.5 7.6 15.7 6.2 6.3 35.8 14.4 18.9 10.7
1982 7.9 7.5 16.3 6.4 5.9 36.1 13.4 18.1 10.7
1983 8.8 7.1 15.5 6.3 5.5 34.4 13.6 18.7 11.2
1984 10.0 6.5 14.4 5.8 5.3 32.0 13.6 19.6 12.4
1985 9.5 6.5 14.8 5.8 5.5 32.6 13.1 18.8 13.1







































































































TAIWAN ASIAN TOTAL 
NICS NICS
1964 .1 .2 .3 1.1 .1 - .1 1.4 2.f
1973 .3 .5 .8 1.4 .9 .3 1.2 3.8 4.7
1978 .5 .6 1.1 1.6 1.6 .4 1.6 5.2 6.3
1979 .5 .6 1.1 1.6 1.6 .5 1.7 5.3 6.4
1980 .5 .6 1.1 1.7 1.4 .5 1.7 5.4 6.H
1981 .6 .7 1.3 1.8 1.7 .6 2.1 6.2 7.E
1982 .6 .7 1.4 1.4 1.8 .6 2.2 6.5 7.S
1983 .7 .9 1.6 1.9 2.0 .7 2.6 7.2 8.E
1984 .9 1.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 .8 2.9 7.9 10.C
1985 .9 1.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 .7 2.9 7.5 9.E
Source: OECD Trade Series C, SITC Revision 2, OECD (1988).
II.2 Trade Flows Over Time, 1967-1987
In this Section I identify the most basic characteristics of the 
flow of exports from the NICs to the United States and the European 
Community. The databank used covers the period from 1967 to 1987, 
beginning- and end-year included. Data are annual, and expressed in 
millions of current U.S. Dollars. The NICs are represented as an area, 
which implies that in this Section we are not going to identify 
individual export-country behavior. Since data for the Community as 
such are not available, we have concentrated on the four largest member 




























































































F i g u r e  I I I . l  T o t a l  V a l u e  o f  U . S .  I m p o r t s  f r o m  N I C s .  M i l l i o n s  o f  C u r r e n t  U . S .  Do]




























































































We start out by concentrating our attention on the contribution of 
total exports by NICs between the United States and Europe. Figure III.l 
is a plot of the total value of U.S. imports from the NICs area measured 
in current Dollars. Figure III.2 plots the percentage of NICs exports 
going to the U.S. as percentage of total exports in any given year —  
where "total exports" is defined as the sum of exports to each of the 
five countries that are the focus of our attention.
The Figures show that the total value of NICs exports to the U.S. 
has increased steadily over the sample period with three noteworthy 
exception: the post-1973 and 1982 recessionary periods, and the sharp 
slowdown of 1985 (and partly 1986). As to the share of exports going to 
the United States (Figure III.2), it was a remarkably steady 70% up to 
1979. The troughs are in 1973, the year of extensive trade controls 
introduced by the Nixon Administration in an attempt to control the 
possible trade effects of the large Dollar depreciation in that year; 
and in 1980, the year in which the Dollar was weakest. From 1980 on the 
U.S. of total NICs exports increases steadily to reach its peak of 81% 
in 1985, year of maximum strength of the Dollar. The fall in the 
following two years is quite noticeable.
Figures in the next four pages are plots of total Dollar value of 
imports (top figure) and share of imports from NICs of each of the four 
largest European countries relative to total European imports — such 
total being defined as the sum of those four countries' imports. 
France's total imports (Figure III.3) grow steadily up to 1981, and they 
flatten out for the entire period during which the Dollar is strongest. 
As the Dollar starts depreciating the growth of French imports from NICs 




























































































F i g u r e  H I . 3 T o t a l  V a l u e  o f  I m p o r t s  o f  F r a n c e  f r o m  N I C s .  C u r r e n t  U . S .  D o l l a r s .




























































































F i g u r e  l i t . 5 T o t n l  V n l u c  o f  Germ nn I m p o r t s  f r o m  N I C s .  C u r r e n t  U . S .  D o l l a r s .
Figure III.6 Share of German Imports on Total European Imports from NICs. 



























































































F i g u r e  I I I . 7 T o t a l  V a l u e  o f  I m p o r t s  o f  I t a l y  f r o m  N I C s .  C u r r e n t  U . S .  D o l l a r s .





























































































F i g u r e  I I I .  9 T o t a l  V a l u e  o f  U .K .  I m p o r t s  f r o m  N I C s .  C u r r e n t  U . S .  D o l l a r s .
Figure III.10 Share of U.K. Imports in Total EEC Imports from NICs. 




























































































III.4) was stable up to 1975, increased sharply between 1975 and 1981, 
and never reached the 1981 peak of roughly 20% again after that.
Germany's imports also flatten out right after 1981, and resume 
their growth after 1985, even though with apparently more sluggish 
reaction than France. Germany's share of European imports (Figure 
III.6) reached a peak of 41% in 1976, and has since declined to 38%. 
Germany is today the most important European partner for the NICs, but 
its importance has diminished over the last decade.
The behavior of Italy's total imports (Figure III.7) is a further 
replica of the French and German pattern: imports grow in the latter 
part of the 1970s, peak in 1980, are flat until 1986, and then pick up 
again sharply. Like Germany, Italy was in 1987 a less important partner 
of NICs than it had been in the past, its share having declined from 18% 
in 1970 to 14% in 1987. Figure III.8 shows troughs in 1976 through 
1978, exactly the years of maximum weakness of the Lira relative to all 
foreign currencies, but especially relative to the Dollar.
Finally, Figure III.9 shows that the pattern of U.K. imports 
followed closely the other European countries', even though in a 
smoother fashion. The pick up in imports starts right along the 
depreciation of the Dollar. The British share of imports (Figure III.10) 
has also fallen over time, but it has been substantially stable recently.
We want to focus now on the rates at which imports from NICs have 
increased during our sample period for each of the countries considered. 




























































































Table III.3 Descriptive Statistics on Average Growth Rates of Inports 
frrtn the NICs Area, 1968-87. Data for the Period 1978-87 in 
Brackets
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Country Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum
FRANCE 22.7 24.0 65.4 -8.5
[16.8] [22.5] [58.7] [-8.5]
GERMANY 19.7 18.9 68.1 -11.2
[12.7] [16.6] [38.1] [-11.2]
ITALY 18.4 22.1 58.8 -10.4
[14.9] [23.4] [52.6] [-9.6]
U.K. 17.3 18.8 69.0 -9.5
[15.4] [18.0] [43.9] [-9.5]
U.S. 21.1 11.6 39.5 -6.7
[17.7] [8.9] [29.0] [2.5]
EUROPE 18.8 18.1 66.7 -4.4
[14.2] [16.8] [42.4] [-4.4]
TOTAL 20.3 12.1 43.6 -4.6








The top part of the Table reports in column 2 the average growth 
rates of imports (measured in current U.S. Dollars), their standard 
deviations (column 3), the maximum [4] and the minimum [5] values over 
the sample period. "Total" stands for total NICs exports. What one can 
learn from this Table is that only France has had a higher rate of 




























































































however, has followed a much steadier path of growth, as it is shown by 
the fact that its maximum rate of growth is the lowest, its minimum 
rate is among the highest, and the standard deviation is one half the 
computed average rate of growth. This implies that the process of 
market penetration in Europe is more chaotic and therefore more 
difficult to model, and to forecast, than that into the American one.
It may be interesting to know to what degree market penetration 
into each individual national market is "synchronized" with that into 
the rest of the Community. To address this issue one can look at the 
simple contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the growth rates 
in each country and in Europe as a total. These descriptive statistics 
are reported in the bottom part of Table III.3, from which one can see 
that Italy is the most "independent" country relative to the Community, 
while Germany is the most "representative." (9)
In order to gain some insights on the dynamics of import growth 
without resorting to econometric analysis, I have reproduced the same 
calculations for the period 1978 to 1987. (10) They are reported in 
brackets in Table III.3. What is noteworthy here is that all average
9. Obviously one must keep in mind that the country share of total 
European imports is a factor in determining the size of the correlation 
coefficient we are looking at, in the sense that the higher the share, 
the higher is likely to be the correlation. However, there may also be 
economic interpretation of this difference in correlations.
10. Clearly, there is little economic reason why the 1978 cut-off date 
ought to be relevant for, if our problem is to study the relationship 
between exchange rates and volume of trade, the period 1985 and onward 
would have been more appropriate to choose. But this choice would have 
left las with only two observations in the latter sample, and very little 




























































































growth rates are lower than they are for the entire sarple period. This 
way be due to the small volumes of imports in the early part of the 
sample, which makes growth rates appear to be high. However there may 
be some economic interpretation to this as well, such as the slowdown of 
the growth of international trade in the early 1980s. This particular 
issue ought to be investigated further.
There are several interesting conclusions to be drawn from the 
foregoing descriptive analysis, though each of them is somewhat weakened 
by the fact that we had to think in terms of Dollar value of imports, 
rather than in actual volumes.
First, it is apparent that the great increase in the share of NICs 
exports absorbed by the U.S. begins in 1980 and ends in 1985. Issues of 
causality aside for the time being, the association of share of imports 
with the growing strength of the Dollar over those very years is 
unquestionable. This is a first, though tentative, indication that the 
value of a currency is very relevant to the direction of trade flows of 
a country.
Second, the dynamics of nominal exchange rates between the Dollar 
and European currencies appear to be associated with the dynamics of 
European imports from NICs. This is a first confirmation of our working 
hypothesis according to which the depreciation of the Dollar not only 
brings about changes in competitiveness between U.S. and Europe, but 
potentially affects the whole pattern of relative prices and trade 
flows.
Third, the relative importance of the four European countries as 




























































































cannot say at this stage whether these changes have been influenced by 
changes of exchange rates among European countries, as well exchange rate 
changes of European currencies relative to the Dollar, but it is clear 
that the latter have played a role. If one chooses 1968 as the year to 
be used for comparisons, this is the way weights have changed over the 
last twenty years:
Table HI.4 Share of Each Country's Imports as a Percentage of Total 
European Imports from NICs
France Germany Italy United 
Kingdom
Europe
1968 11 33 15 41 100.0
1987 18.5 37.5 13.5 30.5 100.0




























































































m . 2  Evolution of the Comodi ty Ocrpositicn of Trade Over Time,
III.2.1 Commodity Composition of Trade Between NICs and U.S., 1967-1987
We have data on exports for the industrial sector subdivided in 
eleven sectors, and the total. The sectors are
I have computed the ratio of each sector's share on total imports 
of the United States from the NICs area for every year for which data 
are available. For each sector I report only the 1967, 1985, and 1987 
data to identify the relative weight of that particular sector in 
overall imports from the NICs area in those years. (11) An important 
difference between the 1967 and the 1987 pictures is that agricultural 
and food products no longer play a major role, which is now played by 
mechanical and electrical machinery. Textiles appear to have a stable
11. Table A.III.5.US in the Appendix reports such values for every year 
for which data are available. Table A.III.6.US, also in the Appendix, 
reports descriptive statistics — mean, standard deviation, maximum, and 
minimum values for the shares of each sector in total exports to the 
U.S. Statistics for the period 1967-1979 are reported in the top part 














CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, GLASS AND CERAMICS 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 
TEXTILE




































































































Table TTT-5 Sectoral Shares of Total Inports in the U-S. frem NICs
1967 1985 1987
1 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
GLASS AND CERAMICS .49 1.12 1.37
2 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 2.41 3.14 2.51
3 TEXTILE 16.12 22.53 23.31
4 WOOD, PARER, AND MISCELLANEOUS 13.23 9.46 11.40
5 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 7.51 35.84 44.00
6 CHEMICALS 4.04 4.26 4.00
7 MINERALS 4.43 .71 .43
8 ENERGY 3.24 14.47 5.70
9 AGRICULTURE 30.04 4.11 3.13
10 POOD PRODUCTS 15.54 3.23 3.11
11 MISCELLANEOUS 2.94 1.14 1.06
N.Bj Columns may not add up to 10Q00 due to rounding
share, and all the other sectors are stable and relatively less 
inportant. The naked eye cannot identify any correlation between these 
shares and the 1985 depreciation of the Dollar. Using the average share 
in each period as a criterion, the ordering of sectors has changed as 
shown in Table III.6.
Table III.6 Ordering of Industrial Sectors as Shares of Total U.S. 
biports fran NICs
1967-1979 1980-1987
TEXTILE 1 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 2 TEXTILE
AGRICULTURE 3 ENERGY
WOOD, PAPER, AND MISCELLANEOUS 4 WOOD, PAPER, AND MISC.
POOD PRODUCTS 5 AGRICULTURE
ENERGY 6 POOD PRODUCTS
CHEMICALS 7 CHEMICALS
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 8 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES
MINERAIS 9 MISCELLANEOUS
MISCELLANEOUS 10 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, 
GLASS AND CERAMICS




























































































III.2.2 Commodity Composition of Trade Between NICs and Europe, 
1967-1987
I have computed the ratio of each sector's share on total imports 
for each of the four major European economies from the NICs area for every 
year for which data are available, (12) as well as average shares for two 
subperiods, and report in the series of Table III.7 the two orderings of 
sectors according to their relevance in each period. (13)
Table III.7.FR Ordering of Industrial Sectors as Shares of Total 
Imports of France frcm NICs
1967-1979 1980-1987
AGRICULTURE 1 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
POOD PRODUCTS 2 ENERGY
TEXTILE 3 POOD PRODUCTS
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 4 TEJCTILE
MINERALS 5 WOOD, PAPER, AND MISC.
WOOD, PAPER, AND MISCELLANEOUS 6 AGRICULTURE
CHEMICALS 7 CHEMICALS




10 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 
construction MATERIALS,
GLASS AND CERAMICS 11 GLASS AND CERAMICS
12. Unlike what I did for the U.S., I do not report in the text the 
1967, 1985, and 1987 data shares of each sector in overall inports from 
the NICs area to the relevant country. Such data are available upon 
request for every year in the sample.
13. Descriptive statistics equivalent to those presented for the U.S. 
in Table A.III.6.US are not reported but available upon request for each 




























































































Table III.7.GE Ordering of Industrial Sectors as Shares of Total
Inports of Germany fran NICs
1967-1979 1980-1987
TEXTILE 1 TEXTILE
AGRICULTURE 2 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
FOOD PRODUCTS 3 AGRICULTURE
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 4 WOOD, PAPER, AND MISC.
MINERALS 5 MINERALS
WOOD, PARER, AND MISCELLANEOUS 6 POOD PRODUCTS
CHEMICALS 7 CHEMICALS
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 8 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES
MISCELLANEOUS 9 MISCELLANEOUS
ENERGY 10 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
GLASS AND CERAMICS 11
GLASS AND CERAMIC
ENERGY
Table III.7.IT Ordering of Industrial Sectors as shares of Total 
Inports of Italy from NICs
1967-1979 1980-1987
Agriculture 1 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
POOD PRODUCTS 2 ENERGY
TEXTILE 3 AGRICULTURE
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 4 TEXTILE
MINERALS 5 WOOD, PAPER, AND MISC.
WOOD, PAPER, AND MISCELLANEOUS 6 POOD PRODUCTS
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES 7 MINERAIS
CHEMICALS 8 CHEMICALS
ENERGY 9 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES
MISCELLANEOUS 10 MISCELLANEOUS
CONSTRUCTION MATERIAIS,






























































































Table III.7.TJK Ordering of Industrial Sectors as Shares of Imports 
of the United Kingian fran NICs
1967-1979 1980-1987
TEXniE 1 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL
AGRIGJL1URE 2 TEXTIIE
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 3 WOOD, PAPER, AND MISC.
WOOD, PAPER, AND MISCELLANEOUS 4 AGRICULTURE
POOD PRODUCTS 5 POOD PRODUCTS
MINERAIS 6 CHEMICALS
CHEMICALS 7 ENERGY
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 8 MISCELLANEOUS
ENERGY 9 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES
MISCELLANEOUS 10 MINERALS
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
GIASS AND CERAMICS 11
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS,
GIASS AND CERAMICS
France and Italy share very similar patterns of inport behavior. 
For both countries agricultural, food, and textile products were the 
most important imports in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In the 1980s 
mechanical and electrical machinery are the most important inport for 
both countries, energy products and food/agricultural products follow, 
and textiles are only fourth in the list. Also in the U.K. textiles 
have ceased to be the major inport expenditures, and they weigh now less 
than expenditures on imports of mechanical and electrical product. 
Germany is the only country for which textiles have kept their role of 
leading imports. However, manufactured mechanical and electrical 
products, in the fourth place a decade ago, are new a strong second.
Thus, two unambiguous indications emerge from these tables. First, 
European countries are converging toward a merchandise composition of 
inports from NIcs that more and more resembles that of the U.S.. Second, 
"traditionally" strong export products from the NICs have been replaced 




























































































IV. LONG FUN TRENDS OF EXPCKES FROM NICS TO US AND EUROPE: EOCNOMEIRIC 
MODELING AND ELASTICITIES ESTIMATIONS
Our goal is to determine whether there is sizable and 
(statistically) significant relationship between exchange rate policy 
and export performance. In this section I address this question by 
estimating partial-equilibrium models of export demand functions. 
First, I discuss a model for the effects of exchange rates on the demand 
for exports. Subsequently, the model is estimated for aggregate exports 
from a country to another. The estimated elasticities with respect to 
exchange rates are the criteria through which potential for import 
penetration can me measured. I also run Granger-causality tests to 
assess the direction of causality between exchange rate and total 
exports for each pair of countries for which the estimated model 
supports the existence of a positive and significant exchange rate- 
export volumes relationship. Finally, we turn to the question of what 
sectors appear to be most affected by exchange rate changes. This issue 
is addressed by estimating inport demand functions for many of seventy- 
one industrial sectors from a selected country. The methodological 
problems involved with the estimation are mostly discussed along with 
the model itself, but sometimes they are where results are discussed.
IV.l A Model for the Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Demand for 
Exports
Partial equilibrium models of exports of developing countries are 
among the most subjected to empirical estimation. Since reviewing 




























































































scope of this report, the reader is referred to the excellent survey by 
Goldstein and Khan (1985) and, for more recent developments, to Marquez 
(1988).
The model employed here draws on the inperfect substitute proto­
type models discussed in Marquez (1988), but I specify the model in a 
different form. In general the model is specified as
[4.1] Xj. Xt_1 - bQ + b-,Yt + b2Rt- + b j Y ^  + b4Rt_i +mt '
where X is the volume of real exports from one country to another, Y is 
a measure of real economic activity in the importing country, —  
usually the real gross national or domestic product— , R is the price of 
the exported goods relative to the domestic price of that good in the 
import country, m is the error term, and the subscripts denote time.
This type of model specification may be adequate for cross-section 
type of data, where there is no autocorrelation for the variables. In a 
time series framework, however, variables expressed in levels are 
generally strongly autocorrelated, and the conditional correlations 
among them may be spurious (Granger and Newbold, 1976). To remove this 
problem I have adopted an error-correction model as suggested by Hendry 
(1979). (14) The error-corrected model specified for estimation of 
short- and long-run impact of exchange rate changes on the volume of
14. While working on this report I became aware that Moreno (1989) was 
carrying out estimations of exchange rate effects on the trade balance 






























































































[4.2] dXf. - bg + b-jdYj. + bjdR̂ . + bgY^-^ + b4Pt-1 + bgX̂ ..̂  + m̂.,
where all tlie symbols are as above and a "d" in front of a variable 
name stands for "first difference" of that variable. With all variables 
expressed in natural logs, b^ and b2 are estimates of the short-run 
impact of changes in economic activity in the importing country and 
prices on the volume of exports. The long-run elasticity with respect to 
income is egual to bg/(-bg), and the long run elasticity with respect to 
relative prices is measured by b̂ j/t-bg).
IV. 2 Enpirical Evidence cn the Relationship Between Exchange Rate and 
Aggregate Exports
A number of data-related issues arise prior to estimation of the 
model specified above. The first problem is related to the definition 
of the dependent variable, which should be expressed in real terms, 
whereas data are available in current U.S. Dollars only. To convert 
U.S. Dollar-denominated exports I have expressed their values in the 
exporting country's currency first, and then deflated such values by the 
export unit value for the exporting country. Thus, at any point in time 
real exports X are given by
X= X($)*e/Px,




























































































domestic currency price of exports, and the $ sign in parentheses means 
that the variable is expressed in U.S. Dollars.
This transformation is obviously not very satisfactory. The 
deflator for exports ought to be based on the actual export prices of 
the exported goods, weighted by the volume of export of that particular 
good. This type of data is not available, and I use export unit values 
instead. (15)
The second variable involved in the estimation is a measure of 
economic activity in the importing country. I use the real GDP for all 
four European countries and real GNP for the U.S. (15) Finally, we need 
a measure of competitiveness to match the export price variable in the 
theoretical model. This variable is defined as
R = e P* / P ,
where R is the real exchange rate, e (15) is the domestic currency price 
of the importing country's currency, P* is the price of the good in the 
importing country's currency, and P the price of the good in the 
exporting country's currency. Again, data on the price of individual 
goods or baskets of goods in different currencies do not exist. Among 
the possible alternatives, I have chosen to use the export unit value as 
a proxy for the exporting country's currency price of the goods, and the 
importing country's CPI (15) to deflate it. Advantages ard shortcomings 
of these choices are discussed in Edwards (1989). Table IV.1 reports 
estimation results for exports from S. Korea to five countries.




























































































Table IV.l Results of Estimation of Model [4-2]












































































ip2 .501 .710 .200 .122 .542
Durbin's H 1.15 1.955 12.3 3.30 .23
F-statistic 4.419 9.805 1.904 1.502 5.266
Number of 
observations 18 19 19 19 19
Note: Numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
(*) GNP for the United States.
There are several features in these results that are worth 
discussing in some detail. First, with only one exception all signs in 
every regression are as expected: an increase in the importing country's 
level of real activity is associated with increasing inports. France is 
the exception, but the coefficient is insignificant by traditional 




























































































competitiveness of South Korean goods, as measured by the real exchange 
rate, are always associated with increasing exports.
The second important result is that the variance of explanatory 
power of the model across countries is very large. The model is 
significant at the 1% level in the case of Germany, at the 5% level for 
France and the United States, and insignificant for Italy and U.K. 
Furthermore, Durbin's h for Italy shows that the error term is serially 
correlated, and the estimates are therefore inefficient.
Thirdly, the impact --that is, within-year—  effect of real 
exchange rate changes on exports is large and significant for Germany 
and United States, large but not significant for France and Italy, and 
totally insignificant for the United Kingdom.
Finally, Table IV.2 summarizes many of these results by reporting 
country-specific long run elasticities of inports from South Korea. The 
elasticities are computed according to the method discussed in section
IV. 1 above.
Table IV.2 Long Run Inocme and Real Exchange Rate Elasticities




Income 6.15 3.76 4.35 5.60 3.00
Real Exchange 
Rate




























































































The estimated elasticities reported in Table IV.2 are very high for 
both income and real exchange rate when compared to results presented 
in the literature. This may be due to having used annual data as 
opposed to quarterly, as it is often the case in the literature, or to 
the choice of deflators to compute the real exchange rate used in the 
estimation. Furthermore, only elasticities for France (both) and 
Germany (real exchange rate only) have been computed on the basis of 
regression coefficients significant at the 5% level or above. All these 
considerations notwithstanding, since the ordering of countries by size 
of elasticity reflects the ordering by regression coefficients sign and 
significance, we can conclude that over the period that goes from 1967 
to 1986 France and Germany were the two countries most affected by 
changes in price of their own goods relative to those of imports. This 
relationship is weaker for the U.S., Italy, and the U.K., in descending 
order. For the latter three countries the increase in domestic 
purchasing power has had a larger effect on imports from South Korea 
than changes in international relative prices.
IV.3 Issues of Time Patterns of Variability and Directions of 
Causality
Ihe estimates of lung-run elasticities supplied above suffer from 
some weaknesses related to the model's apparent inability to remove 
serial correlation of the error terms in the case of Italy and the U.K.. 
In addition, regression coefficients are measures of co-variation of 
variables, and in general have little to say about the actual direction 
of causality among variables: it is the modeler's prior that allows to 




























































































relative to the dependent variable.
A way to test the robustness of our results is to resort to the 
basic causality test devised by Granger, which is a way of assessing 
whether the independent variable in the regression equation does 
actually precede the dependent variable in time. Obviously, time 
ordering does not necessarily reflect causality ordering — a variable 
may react today to a future expected change in another variable, if the 
agent is forward-looking, and the time ordering of changes would mislead 
the observer as to the "true" direction of causality.
In the present context, however, Granger causality tests should not 
be too worrisome. We are going to test for the time pattern of changes 
in the bilateral real exchange rate and the importing country's income 
on the one hand, and the volume of exports from a small country to a 
large one on the other. As to the relationship between imports and 
importing country's income, there is no prior theoretical reason why 
exports from South Korea to France — a small fraction of France's total 
imports anyway—  ought to lead France's income. On the other hand, 
theory suggests that the real bilateral exchange rate ought to lead 
changes in the volume of trade between two countries. If the exchange 
rate is, at least to some extent, the relative price of assets, theory 
suggests that changes in fundamentals ought to be reflected in the 
exchange rate before changes in goods prices and real economic activity. 
Thus, we would expect to see both the exchange rate and the importing 
country's income to lead the volume of trade in time. Table IV.3 
reports the results of all the Granger causality tests run for exports 




























































































Table 1V.3 Granger Causality Tests for the Relationship Between 
Inports, Income, and Competitiveness. Null Hypothesis: Inports 
Are Not Led by "Variable”
FRANCE
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
Causality
Test
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variable R2 F(6,12) ~R2 F(3,16) F(3,13)
GDP .88 20.60 .88 38.28 1.706
R .86 16.47 .577
GERMANY
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
Causality
Test
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variable R2 F(6,13) ~R2 F(3,17) F(3,14)
GDP .94 42.84 .94 80.27 1.716
R .94 46.54 2.247
ITALÏ
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
Causality
Test
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variable R2 F(6,13) ~R2 F(3,17) F(3,14)
GDP .74 8.76 .71 14.07 6.408
R .67 6.35 .619
UNITED KINGDOM
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
Causality
Test
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variable R2 F(6,13) _R2 F (3,17) F(3,14)
GDP .99 195.88 .97 176.20 1.580
R .96 69.71 1.851
UNITED STATES
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
Causality
Test
. [1] (2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variable R2 F(6,13) “r 2 F(3,17) F(3,14)
GDP .98 156.39 .96 135.32 9.071




























































































Results from the last column in Table IV.3 lend support to the 
hypothesis that the real bilateral exchange rate never leads the volume 
of real imports for any of the five countries in the sample. On the 
other hand, real income is the leading variable for two countries out of 
five — Italy and the U.S., at the 1% significance level.
Two results stand out in concluding this section. The first is 
that general models of import demand and export performance are too 
simple-minded to be of much relevance for any given country. The model 
specified and estimated here is insignificant for two countries out of 
five — Italy and the U.K. More qualitative and institutional-type work 
is needed before more complete country-specific import demand functions 
can be specified to yield results of interest to the policy maker.
The second result to be highlighted is that the level of aggregate 
demand in the importing country appears to be a better predictor of 
export performance by the exporting country than the real bilateral 
exchange rate. This conclusion is supported by both the error- 
correction model and the Granger causality tests. While one cannot 
simply conclude that therefore price competitiveness is irrelevant, 
there results do support the theoretical claim that exchange rate 
policies are short-run policies, whose effects on export performance 
disappear over the longer run.
The issue of short-run effectiveness of exchange rate policy to 
promote export performances is discussed further in section V. We now 
attempt to identify correlations between exchange rate and export 




























































































IV. 4 Using Export Demand Functions to Identify Sectors Sensitive to 
Exchange Rate Changes
Goal of this section is to determine whether there exists a 
relationship between exchange rate and export performance at a 
disaggregated level of product definition. The dataset (15) contains 
annual data, from 1967 to 1986, for seventy-one industrial sectors, plus 
a miscellaneous goods sector.
We start out by grouping sectors according to data availability, 
(16) and distinguish among five categories:
A. Sectors for which all observations tafce on zero values;
B. Sectors for which no more than five observations are non-zero;
C. Sectors for which no more than ten observations are non-zero;
D. Sectors for which at least fourteen observations are non-zero;
E. Sectors for which all observations are non-zero. (17)
I arbitrarily decided to restrict model estimation to those sectors 
with at least fourteen non-zero observations. The thirty-six sectors 
meeting this requirement — actually thirty-five, plus the total—  are 
those identified with a letter D or F in Table IV.4 .
15. The data, collected and published by EUROSTAT, was accessedthrough 
CEPII, Paris.
16. Our criterion for the choice of sectors to focus upon does not allow 
to identify the "emerging" sectors, but this is a price that must be 
paid in order to be able to attach statistical significance to the 
results.
17. Obviously this classification is also revealing of the time pattern 
of inport penetration. For instance, goods represented in group E have 
been imported since 1967, whereas most of the goods represented in group 




























































































The problem is now to determine which of thirty-six sectors appears 
to be sensitive to exchange rate changes, and which does not. One way 
of addressing the question would be to estimate inport demand functions 
for each sector from the rest of the world. We do not follow this route 
because the real effective exchange rate for Hong Kong is not available, 
and we would have to build our own. Furthermore, I prefer to stay away 
from estimates of the world's real aggregate activity level. Thus, I 
have chosen to estimate the model for exports from Hong Kong to Italy. 
This is a totally random choice, and there is little a-priori knowledge 
that things should be radically different, or very close, for the other 
major industrial countries for which data are available.
The model to be estimated is
[1] dMj. = bQ + bxdRGNPt + bjdRERf.
t  b3 [M .̂_3 — R G N P ^ ^ ] t  b ,̂ [ M _3 — R ER^_^] +  7tf̂ _
where dY^.=Y^-Y^_1( M is the volume of inports, PGUP is the Real GNP of 
the importing country, RER is the Real Exchange Rate, and t denotes 
time. Estimates of b-ĵ and b2 are reported in Table TV.4, columns 5 and 7 
respectively. Coefficient estimates for the error-correction parts of 
the model are not reported but available from the author.
Fifteen sectors turn out to pass the requirements I imposed: 
positive and significant coefficient on the importing country's real 
income, positive and significant coefficient on the real exchange rate. 




























































































TABLE IV.4 SectorDefinition,Category,and Responsiveness to Exchange 
Rate Changes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [H] [10]
1 BA CEMENT AND PLASTERS B
2 BB CERAMIC, TILES AND BRICKS E + n + n 34 2.3 3.3
3 BC GLASS FL. GLASS AND DER. E + y + n 51 2.3 5.6
4 CA IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS B
5 CB FIRST TRANSF. FER. PROD. A
6 CC NON-FERROUS METALS C
7 DA SPINNING AND WEAVING PR. E + n - n 36 1.9 3.5
8***DB MANUFACTURED CIOTHES E + y + y 67 1.6 10.3
9***DC HOSIERY AND KNITWEAR E + y + y 63 1.4 8.6
10 DD CARPETS ,OTH. FIN. TEXTIL E + n + n 21 2.3 2.2
11***DE LEATHER FURS AND SHOES E + y + y 66 1.8 9.8
12***EA WOOD PRODUCTS E + y + y 39 2.0 3.9
13 EB FURNITURES AND DERIVATED E - n - n .0 1.8 1.1
14 EC PAPER PASTE,PAP.,P.BOARD D + y + n 24 1.5 2.4
15***ED PRINTING PRODUCTS D + y + y 64 2.0 8.9
16***EE MIS.MAN.PROD. N.E.S. E + y + y 59 1.5 7.5
17 FA MODELED FOUNDRY PROD. C
18 FB METAL AND MECH. PROD. E + y + n 32 1.7 3.2
19 FC MOT.TURB.LUMPS ENG. N.E.S. D - n - n 26 1.9 2.5
20 FD MACHIN. AND AGRIC. PROD. A
21 FE MACHINE-TOOLS C
22 FF MOV. EXTRACT. CONST. ENG. C
23 FG SPECIALIZED MACHINERY D + n + n .1 2.4 2.5
24 FH WEAPONS A
25***FI PRECISION INSTRUMenS D + y + y 52 1.7 5.8
26***FJ CLOCK WATCH.MAKING INDUS. E + y + y 50 1.9 5.6
27***FK OPT. IHOTO. AND FILMS BQ. E + y + y 33 1.8 3.2
28 FL ELECTRONICAL COMPONENTS D + n - n .0 1.9 1.0
29 FT4 DOMESTIC ELECTRON. PROD. E + n + n .0 1.6 1.1
30 FN TELECOMMUNICATION PROD. D + y - n 20 2.5 2.1
31***P0 OFFICE EQUIP. AND OOMLUT. D + y + y 52 2.1 5.9
32***FP HOUSEHOLD ELECTR. EQUIP. D + y + y 54 2.1 6.3
33 FQ HEAVY EIECTR. EQUIP. D + n + n 12 3.0 1.6
34 FR SMALL EL. EQ. AND DERIV. E + y + n 56 2.4 6.7
35 FS SPARE PARTS B
36 FT CYCLES,MOTO ,PASS. CARS D - n + n 40 2.0 4.0
37 FU COMM. VEHIC. OTH. TRANSP. B
38 FV SHIPS D + n + n 24 1.8 2.5
39 FW SPACE AERON.CONS B
40 GA BAS. CHEMICAL PROD. C
41 GB FERTIL. AGRIC. CHEMICALS B
42***GC ORGANIC CHEMICALS D + y + y 56 1.7 6.7
43 GD PAINTS VARNISHES TINTS C
44 GE SHAV. IOT. SOAPS PERFUMES C
45 GF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS D + n + n 29 2.2 2.9
46 GG PLASTICS FIBERS RESINS C
47***GH PLASTIC PRODUCTS E + y + y 51 2.1 5.7
48 GI RUBBER PRODUCTS C
49 HA IRON ORES B




























































































[ 1] [ 2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
51 HC RAW MATERIALS N.E.S.
52 IA COAL AND LIGNITE
53 IB CRUDE PETROLEUM
54 IC NATURAL GAS
55 ID OTH. PRIMARY ENERG. PROD.
56 IG COKE, COAL LIGNITE DERIV.
57 IH PETROLEUM DERIVATED
58 II GAS DELIVERIES
59 U ELEC.WARM WATER STEAM DEL
60 JA CEREALS
61 JB OIH FOOD AGRIC. PROD.
62 JC AGRIC. PROD. FOR INDUSTRY
63 KA CEREALS DERTVATED PROD.
64 KB VEGETABLE ANIMALS FATS
65 KC MEAT POULTRY AND FISH
66 KD CANNED MEAT PCXJLT. FISH
67 KE CANNED FRUIT VEGET. N.E.S.
68 KF SUGAR CHOCOLATE CANDIES
69 KG PET FOOD


















+ n + n 55 2.3 6.6
E
B






+ n n 17 1.6 1.9
E + y + y 41 2.1 4.1
E 4- y + y 72 1.5 12.8
Note: Column [1]: ordering number; [2]: data-source code for the
sector. The first letter identifies the sector in the 10-sector 
breakdownto which each of the 71 disaggregated sectors belong. 
[3]: sector definition (product description); [4]: product catego­
ry; [5]: sign of the real income coefficient; [6]: significance of 
[5] at the 5% significance level; [7]: coefficient on the real 
exchange rate; [8] significance of [7] at the 5% level; [9] R- 
squared corrected for degrees of freedom; [10] Durbin-Watson 
statistic. The statistics are not valid as a test for serial cor­
relation in the present context; [11] F-statistic of the 
regression; *** identifies sectors for which the estimated model 
yields coefficient estimates significant at the 5% level.
The list of products for which a significant correlation between 
export performance and exchange rate was found follows. Clearly, one 
should not conclude from these results that these are the only products 
whose degree of price competitiveness has increased due to exchange rate 




























































































8 DB MANUFACTURED CLOTHES
9 DC HOSIERY AND KNITWEAR
11 DE LEATHER FURS 7\ND SHOES
12 EA WOOD PRODUCTS
15 ED PRINTING PRODUCTS
16 EE MIS.MAN.PROD. N.E.S.
25 FI PRECISION INSTRUMENTS
26 F,T nnoK WATCHMAKING TlfftlS.
2 7 FK OPT. maio. AND FILMS 1X2.
31 FO OFFICE EQUIP. AND OOMEOT.
32 FP HOUSEHOLD EIECTR. EQUIP.
42 GC ORGANIC CHEMICALS
47 GH PIASTIC PRODUCTS
72 MISCELLANEOUS N.E.S.
73 TOTAL
changes in the goods' degree of price competitiveness. However, the 
fact remains that the goods in the above list are the same ones that 





























































































V. HIE EFFECTS OF DOLLAR DEIHECIATION ON THE RE-DIRECTION OF NICS 
EXPORTS FROM THE US TO EUROPE: EVIEFHCE FRCM MCKIHLY DATA
V.l Exchange Rates and Rattem of Total Exports: the Case of South Korea
In February 1985 the U.S. Dollar peaked relative to all major 
European currencies and the Japanese Yen. Since then it has depreciated 
sharply and then recovered somewhat, but it is well below that all-time 
high. The question we address in this section is whether there exists a 
short run relationship between trade flows and exchange rate.
We start out with the analysis of monthly data on total exports 
from South Korea to the Community as a whole and to the world for the 
period from January 1984 to December 1988. The hypothesis we want to 
test is whether it can be said that the Dollar depreciation that began 
in February/March 1985 has had an impact on the allocation of exports 
between the Community and the rest of the world. (18)
Figure V.l is a plot of total monthly exports from South Korea 
(solid line, left scale) and of South Korean exports to the Community of 
twelve. Both series are expressed in millions of U.S. Dollars, even though 
they have been derived from two different sources. (19) It is apparent
18. Unfortunately we do not have similar data for the Community as a 
whole and the United States. This implies that we have to focus on the 
rest of the world rather than specifically on the U.S.
19. Total exports data are from the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics, country page on Korea, line 70. The data, originally In Won, 
was converted to dollars through the nominal bilateral exchange rate 
between the Won and the Dollar from IFS, line ae. The dotted line 
represents data for total exports to the Community of twelve, and is 




























































































Figure V.l Tot ni South Koronn Exports (solid line, left nenie, billions of 




























































































from the figure that exports to the EEC and those to the rest of the 
world have moved roughly at the same pace throughout the sanple period. 
Figure V.2 reports the time pattern of the share of South Korean exports 
to the EEC relative to total exports (solid line, left scale), and the 
exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and the Won. The first month of 
the year is always a local peak because of both high imports from the EC 
and relatively low total imports from the world in that month. In 
January 1985 this results in an abnormally high share of South Korean 
goods going to the Community: this latter fact is of no consequence, but 
the recurring peak in January points out the existence of important 
seasonal cycles.
It is important to notice in this figure that there appears to be a 
high correlation between the Dollar value of the Won and the share of 
total South Korean exports going to the Community. Ihe latter falls as 
the Dollar appreciates relative to the Won in the early part of the 
sample, and it increases drastically in correspondence of a drastic 
Dollar depreciation. The breakdcwn of this correlation in the last two 
months of 1988 appears to be due to the seasonal behavior of exports. 
Sometimes in late 1985, therefore, there was a sharp turnaround in the 
trend of the share of EC imports from South Korea. Table V.l reports 
some descriptive statistics for the two subperiods separated by December 
1985. Even without correcting for the 1985.01 abnormally high value of 
the ratio, the average is higher in the second period, it variance is 




























































































Fleure V.2 Shnrc of Tot ni S. Knrcnn Exports going to tlio EEC (solid line, left 




























































































Table V.l Descriptive Statistics for the Share of Total S. Korean 
Exports Going to the Ocmnunity of Twelve
Mean S.D. Max. Min.
1984.01- .086 .025 .162* .049
1985.12
1986.01 .138 .021 .186 .095
1988.12
* In 1985.01
Was this a result of the depreciation of the Dollar? Figure V.3 
shows the time dynamics of the bilateral Won-ECU exchange rate (solid 
line, measured on the left scale) and the Dollar-ECU rate. (20) Dollar 
and Won follow exactly the same pattern relative to the ECU up until 
February 1985, when the ECU bottoms relative to both. After that, 
however, the Won depreciates much faster than the Dollar until the end 
of 1987, when the ECU peaks relative to both. The implication is that 
goods priced in Won were becoming less expensive in terms of ECUs even 
faster than goods priced in Dollars. Thus, it is fair to conclude that 
for nearly three years — from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1987- 
movements of the Worv/ECU nominal bilateral exchange rate were such to 
enhance the price competitiveness of South Korean exports even relative
20. The Won-ECU rate was computed as the cross-rate between Dollar and 
ECU on the one hand and Dollar and Won on the other. The source for 




























































































Figure V.3 IH Intern! Won/ECU Exchange Rate (Left Scale, Solid Line) and 




























































































to Dollar-priced goods. For the whole of 1988 both the Dollar and the 
Won appreciate relative to the ECU, but the former does so at a much 
faster rate.
In order to test the hypothesis that the nominal bilateral exchange 
rate between the Won and the ECU has had an impact on the short-run 
distribution of South Korean exports between the Community and the rest 
of the world, I have experimented with four different econometric 
models. The general form of the four models is
[5.1] Ŝ . = bQ + bjSj._̂  ■+• + b 3et + m̂ _ ,
where S is the share of total S. Korean exports going to the 
Community, X is the volume of real total exports, e is the nominal 
bilateral exchange rate between the Won and the ECU — the Korean 
currency price of the ECU, m is an error term, and the subscript t 
denotes time. This model is estimated first exactly the way it is 
specified in [5.1]? the second specification corrects for first-order 
serial correlation through the traditional Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
procedure; the third is again model [5.1] with both dependent variables 
and real exports corrected for seasonal patterns; and the fourth 
specification replicates the second and the third together, in that it 
includes both seasonal adjustments and correction for first-order serial 
correlation.
Results are reported in Table V.2. All four models assume that 




























































































countries in the short run as it is reflected by the fact that we use 
the nominal exchange rate as a regressor, whereas the real rate was used 
in the previous section to estimate long-run elasticities.
Table V.2 Short Run Models for the Effects of Nominal Exchange Rates 












c -.0178 .151 -.013 .112







Exports -.0025 -.006 -.0008 -.003
[3.24] [9.21] [1.12] [4.74]
Nominal Rate
Won/ECU .00020 .00016 9.9D-5 1.2D-4





R2 .60 .73 .78 .82
F-statistic 29.92 55.45 71.62 86.87
Q-statistic
(24 lags) 25.90 26.50 14.39 20.42
Number of




























































































The Q-statistics for whiteness of residuals show that seasonal 
adjustment does more to improve efficiency of estimates than correction 
for first-order serial correlation.
The four models yield rather consistent results, even though 
conclusions ought to be based largely on the third one. The nominal 
value of the Won vis-a-vis the ECU is always a significant factor 
affecting the share of total exports going to the Community. This share 
also appears to be a consistently negative function of the value of 
total real exports from South Korea --which is probably to be 
interpreted as a sign that the U.S. market is the "locomotive" for the 
South Korean export sector. There appear to be little doubt that 
exchange rate policies do have short run effects on the redirection of 
trade flows.
V.2 Exchange Rates and Merchandise Pattern of Exports form South Korea
to the Oammity
I now want to present evidence on the pattern of South Korean 
exports to the Community on a sectoral basis. A breakdown of exports 
for ten industrial sectors is available on a monthly basis for the same 
period covered above. First, I present some descriptive evidence on the 
dynamics of the composition of imports for the Community; then we turn 
to estimating a model similar to the one used above for each of the ten 
sectors in the dataset. The meaning of the latter exercise is to 





























































































Table V.3 reports monthly average rates of growth of EC imports 
from South Korea at the level of ten industrial sectors (plus the 
total). All rates have been computed out of series denominated in 
current ECUs.
Thble V.3 Average Monthly Growth of Crximmlty Imparts frah Sc*ith Korea
1984 1985 1986 1987
1984-
1988 1988
1. FOOD PRODUCTS 15.2 7.6 3.6 11.0 9.3 NA
2. BEVERAGES 9.1 4.3 3.5 - .9 3.9 NA
3. CRUDE MATERIALS 9.9 12.4 14.4 5.4 10.6 NA
6. CHEMICALS 5.8 5.8 4.7 8.0 6.1 NA
7. MANUFACTURED GOODS - 4.9 6.9 4.5 3.4 2.6 NA
8. MACHINERY AND 
TRANSP. EQUIPMENT
5.5 7.6 7.4 4.7 6.3 NA
9. MISC. MANUFACTURES - 4.6 7.1 8.6 6.9 4.6 NA
10. GOODS N.E.S. 35.9 27.0 9.0 10.9 20.4 NA
11. TOTAL - 2.3 4.2 5.1 4.3 3.0 .16
N.B.: Values for sectors 4 (Mineral and Fuels) and 5 (Animal and 
vegetable oils) are not large enough for these statistics to be 
meaningful.
As one would have expected, 1984, which was the year in which 
European currencies were weakest relative to both the Dollar and the 
Won, was also the year of slowest growth of South Korean exports into 
the Community, with a negative monthly average growth. This never 




























































































sectors show negative growth --with the exception of sector 2 in 1987. 
Since these figures are in ECUs, the support they lend to the hypothesis 
that nominal exchange rate changes do have real effects in the short 
run is all the stronger.
To see whether any sectoral effects of exchange rate changes can be 
detected, I specified and estimated the following model:
[5.2] Xj = b0 + b-jTjXj + bje + m ,
where Xj is the total import value of South Korean goods classified 
under sector j, bQ is a constant, jXj is the total value of imports 
from that country, e is the nominal bilateral exchange rate between Won 
and ECU, and m is the error term. In the estimated model all variables 
are in log, and the coefficients can therefore be interpreted as short- 
run elasticities. Furthermore, the model has been estimated correcting 
for serial correlation of error terms. Table V.4 reports only the 
results necessary to 'rank' sectors according to their apparent 
reactivity to changes in nominal exchange rates.
In interpreting the results on Table V.4 it ought to be kept in 
mind that the overall effect of exchange rate changes on South Korean 
exports to the Community is captured in what I have called "estimated 
elasticity with respect to total imports." Estimated elasticities 
reported in the second column of the table, therefore, are to be 
interpreted as measures of sector-specific effects of nominal bilateral 




























































































Table V.4 Estimated Sectoral Short Run Elasticity with Respect to 
Nominal Exchange Rates and Total Inports. Standard Errors in 
Brackets
E S t i m a t e d E 1 a s t i c i t i e s
S e c t o r
w.r.t. total imports w.r.t. exchange rate
1. FOOD PRODUCTS .431 [.237] .506 [.428]
2. BEVERAGES -.090 [.196] -.359 [.352]
3. CRUDE MATERIALS .532 [.310] -.730 [.564]
6. CHEMICALS .515 [.175] .266 [.303]
7. MANUFACTURED GOODS .650 [.082] .121 [.857]
8. MACHINERY AND .784 [.183] 1.228 [.430]
TRANSP. EQUIPMENT
9. MISC. MANUFACTURES 1.265 [.109] -.762 [.237]
10. GOODS N.E.S. .984 [.400] -.788 [.770]
I briefly comment on the results in each of the columns separately. 
It appears from the first column that the fastest-growing inports from 
South Korea into the Community are, in descending order of relevance, 
miscellaneous manufactures, assorted goods not assigned to a specific 
category, machinery and transport equipment. All the other goods imports 
grow at a rate lower than total imports, and the Import of beverages is 
declining. As to the reactivity of each sector to changes in the 
exchange rate, machinery and transport equipment are the goods most 
benefiting from them, followed by food products and chemicals. On 
several other sectors the value of the Won appears to have had the 
opposite effect, often in a significant manner. There is no doubt that 





























































































Hie research reported here had two goals: to document the time and 
commodity patterns of Community imports from Newly Industrializing 
Countries (NICs) over the last twenty years; and to identify the role 
of the exchange rate in determining the patterns of NICs trade over the 
same period. While the former goal was descriptive in nature, the latter 
is an attempt at uncovering the existence of possible causal links 
between the geographical distribution of NICs exports and their exchange 
rate policy.
In the first section I simply presented some descriptive statistics 
about a number of developing countries. The purpose here was to 
highlight the importance of outward orientation of countries that are 
known instances of "successful development."
Section II was divided in two parts. In the first part I discussed 
the theoretical channels that would lead changes in nominal exchange 
rates to have real effects — on the volume of trade and its direction, 
on aggregate economic activity, and resource reallocation within the 
exporting country. The discussion led to the tentative conclusion that 
the typical chain of causality devaluation-cheaper exports-current 
account surplus-higher aggregate economic activity is not necessarily 
working in the smooth fashion that much of the literature of the 1950s 
and 1960s described. In the second part of the section I reported 
state-of-the-art estimates of income and price elasticities of developed 
countries' imports from NICs. The low values of these estimates are 
strongly supportive of the doubts raised in the first part of the 




























































































smooth processes leading to export growth.
In section III I began working on the descriptive part of the 
project, which yielded some interesting tentative conclusions about the 
patterns of trade of the major EEC member countries and the U.S.. First, 
there exists a correlation between the bilateral exchange rate and the 
value of inports of these countries, as it is confirmed by the fact that 
U.S. imports from the NICs increased most during the years of maximum 
Dollar strength, and that EEC imports increased most after 1985, the 
years of Dollar weakness. Secondly, the shares of each of the major EEC 
member countries in total European imports from NICs have changed 
markedly, apparently in correlation with changes in each country's 
exchange rate relative to the U.S. Dollar.
Ihe commodity composition of those imports has also changed. First, 
European countries cure converging toward a pattern of inport composition 
that more and more resembles that of the U.S.. Secondly, the 
"traditional" NICs exports such as textiles and agricultural products 
have become less Important, while mechanical and electrical manufactures 
are now the most important import category.
In section IV I addressed the question of long-run effects of 
exchange rate changes: is it possible to identify long lasting effects 
of currency depreciation on the volume of exports at the aggregate or 
the industry level? The answer to this question is that is general 
income growth in the importing country is a more crucial factor than 
changes in relative prices. In the long run, when changes in domestic 
prices tend to adjust following exchange rate shocks, competitiveness is 




























































































considerations than by changes in exchange rates. But in the short run 
— one year or less in our framework—  exchange rate changes do appear to 
have a substantial impact. Tills is not necessarily so in general, for 
countries such as France and Italy do not show any sizable reaction to 
the change even in the shorter time frame; but the relationship is 
there, and rather strong, for Germany and the U.S..
As a way to test the robustness of these conclusions I run 
traditional bivariate causality tests to assess whether there exists any 
consistent patterns of lead-and-lag between the exchange rate and the 
volume of exports. The conclusion for all countries involved was that 
the real exchange rate never leads exports in time.
The next question to be addressed was whether such an apparent 
neutrality of the real exchange rate on the volume of trade hides any 
effects at the industry level. One may suspect that the effect of 
exchange rate changes is more on the composition of exports, than on the 
volume of exports itself, as I have argued to some extent in section II. 
I analyzed this issue for seventy-one sectors for which data are 
available since 1967, and generated a list of products whose export 
performance appears to have been positively affected by exchange rate 
changes. The list appears at the end of section IV.
On the basis of the econometric analysis conducted in section IV we 
have to conclude that exchange rate changes are more likely 1. to 
affect the export performance of a country in the short than in the long 
run; and 2. to affect the export performance of individual industries 
than of a country as a whole. Thus, in section V I shifted the focus of 




























































































the industry level on the basis of monthly data between 1984 and 1988. 
Data availability forced the choice of South Korea as the export 
country. It appears from our results that the fastest-growing imports 
from South Korea into the Community are, in descending order of 
relevance, miscellaneous manufactures, assorted goods not assigned to a 
specific category, machinery and transport equipment. All the other 
goods imports grow at a rate lower than total inports, and the inpart of 
beverages is declining. As to the reactivity of each sector to changes 
in the exchange rate, machinery and transport equipment are the goods 
most benefiting from them, followed by food products and chemicals. On 
several other sectors the value of the Won appears to have had the 
opposite effect, often in a significant manner. Once again we find, as 
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